The offensive plan was to attack the Green Bay defense in every conceivable manner and area, and the result was 442 yards of offense, 43 percent third-down conversions and effective control with more than 33 minutes of possession. More important, the decision to go on fourth-and-inches from the Chicago 32 with half the fourth quarter to play was a belief statement by Marc Trestman in all areas of his offense, including coaches.
“I can’t say there was any great analytical reasoning involved [in the fourth-down decision],” Trestman said. “It was a sense that we needed to stay on the field and I felt that we could and that is what we did. I knew one way or the other that I wouldn’t look back and regret the decision that was made.”
The defense obviously received an enormous boost from not having to face Aaron Rodgers after the Green Bay quarterback suffered a broken collarbone in the first quarter. The unit had horrendous breakdowns early, not all attributable to the two rookie starting linebackers, but adjustments were made and the Packers were held to 149 total yards in the second half even with running back Eddie Lacy rushing for 92 of them.
In eight Green Bay possessions over the final three quarters the defense forced six punts and stopped the Packers three times in the Chicago end of the field.
Special teams suffered from performance gaffes (blocked punt, muffed onside kick) but allowed only one Green Bay possession (after the blocked punt) to start in the Chicago end of the field.